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Abstract
Recent research shows that the gap in learning achievement between private and
government schools in India can be explained away by self-selection. Analysing
four rounds of panel data and distinguishing between ‘knowing’ and ‘applying’
dimensions of maths learning, I find that there is no private school advantage in
the applying domain but that there is an advantage in the knowing domain.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses an important debate over whether private schools perform better
than government schools in India. This debate has far-reaching implications for develop-
ing countries more generally. Despite increased access to education, few countries have
school systems that provide quality education for all, and there is mixed evidence as to
whether private schools can address this gap.1
Enrolments in Indian private schools are growing (Kingdon 2007), and parents opt
for private schools if they can afford them (Srivastava and Noronha 2016). While this
suggests that private schools increase pupils’ learning and there is some evidence to
support this view (e.g. Kingdon 1996; Goyal 2009), recent studies including Chudgar and
Quin (2012), Singh (2015) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) find that the
private school advantage can largely be explained away by self-selection. The aim of this
paper is to test whether private schools do offer an advantage having controlled for any
effects of self selection.
Towards this end, I distinguish between two dimensions of maths learning: ‘Knowing’
and ‘applying’. ‘Knowing’ involves number identification and arithmetic operations and
‘applying’ entails being able to apply mathematical concepts and reasoning in real life. I
compare learning in both domains in private and government schools using four rounds of
panel data from the Young Lives study (Huttly and Jones 2014; Boyden 2014b,a; Boyden
et al. 2016). I find that applying-maths scores are lower than knowing-maths scores
in both types of schools, and that there is no private school advantage in the applying
domain. But, there is a private school advantage in knowing-maths scores of at least
0.26σ which is strongest (0.65σ) for children who have throughout studied in private
school.
As far as I know, this is the first attempt to distinguish between these twin types
1For instance, Jimenez and Lockheed (1995) provide cross-country evidence favouring private schools,
whereas Newhouse and Beegle (2006) and Somers et al. (2004) do not find evidence of a private-school
advantage.
of maths abilities in the Indian context. The distinction and the results are important
because they explain why parents might prefer private schools even though there is no
evidence that they offer an advantage in the ‘applying’ domain. From a policy perspective,
they are also important because they suggest that increasing enrolment in private schools
is unlikely to improve real-world mathematical abilities.
2 Data
The Young Lives study tracks 2000 children in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Telan-
gana over four survey rounds, conducted in 2002 (when the children were aged 1), 2006
(aged 5), 2009 (aged 8), and 2013 (aged 12). To effectively control for self-selection into
school types, I control for children’s schooling trajectories from age 5 onwards besides a
detailed set of household characteristics: the child’s sex, caste, a dummy for first-born,
father and mother’s years of education, the household’s primary occupation, household
size through survey rounds 1-4, and household income through rounds 2-4. Income data
are not available in round 1, so instead I use four indices as proxies: quality of housing,
furniture, amenities (cooking fuel, toilet etc.) and electrical appliances, each calculated
using polychoric principal components analysis (Kolenikov and Angeles 2009). I also
control for region (Coastal Andhra Pradesh, Rayalaseema, Telangana) and type of habi-
tation (rural or urban). 1630 observations remain after dropping cases where on one or
more variables are missing.
2.1 Mathematical abilities
School education aims to impart mathematical abilities, and in particular, the ability to
apply mathematical concepts to solve real-world problems (Kilpatrick et al. 2001). To do
so, a child must know concepts like numbers or operations like addition, and recognise
how and when to apply them according to the problem. Knowing and Applying are
thus two key cognitive domains for assessing mathematical competencies in the Trends
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in International Mathematics and Science Study, an international benchmark assessment
(see Mullis et al. 2009). Questions that test application are usually formulated as word-
problems, and involve translating information from language to maths, and selecting an
appropriate operation. Instead, problems that test knowing involve the ability to recall
information, recognise symbols (like ÷), and implement the corresponding algorithms.
Example Q1. A piece of rope 204 cm. long is cut into 4 equal pieces. Which of these 
gives the length of each piece in centimeters?	

a) 204 + 4 	

b) 204 x 4 	

c) 204 – 4 	

d) 204 ÷ 4 	

	

Example Q2. Based on the 
receipt, answer the following 
question[s] by marking the 
correct answer with an X. 	

	

Anitha wants to buy 38 T-
shirts. How much will she 
pay? 	

a)  Rs. 325 	

b)  Rs. 494 	

c)  Rs. 484 	

d)  Rs. 304	

SET D 
ĥƘంద ఇǩŖన  ĥƘంİ  రĽీదు ĵను ఒక బటśల దుĥాణంలĐ ĥóనుĦĆల¡ ĨేĽిన తర ĺాత ఇǩŖంİ. రĽీదు లþ ĥóǵŤĨĆటų  ఖȆల¡ 
ఉĲŤķ, ĺాటలĐ సమĨరంలÌదు. జగƘతŠĦా చదవంĬ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the receipt, answer the following questions by marking the correct answer with an X.  
 
      ĳ¿ ౖ రĽీదు ఆıరంĦా,  ĥంİ పƔశŤలక¡ సĸ²Óన సమıĲǵŤ  గĸŠంǩ  'X' అǵ గర Š  ĳ¿టśంĬ.  
 
Q.1. How many items did Bhanu buy?  
ĵనుఎǵŤవసుŠ వ­ల¡ĥóĲŤడ¦?  
a. 199 
b. 209 
c. 198 
d. 208 
 
 
 
Q.2. Anitha wants to buy 38 T-shirts. How much will she pay? 
అǵత 38 ట-షర ś ల¡ ĥóĲలను క¡ంటంİ, İǵĥ తను ఎంతĨెȃųంĨȃ? 
a. Rs. 325 
b. Rs. 494 
c. Rs. 484 
d. Rs. 304 
 
 
 
 
Q.3. How much did Bhanu spend in Chennai Silks shop?  
  ĵను  ĨెĲ±ౖŤĽిȽŐǇ  దుĥాణంలĐఎంత ఖర Ŗ ĳ¿టś డ¦? 
a. Rs. 1982 
 
Chennai Silks Shop 
 
No. of 
items 
 
DESCRIPTION UNIT 
PRICE 
LINE TOTAL DISCOUNT 
10 Trousers [Rs.12] [Rs.120] [Rs. 24] 
25 T-shirts [Rs.13] [Rs.325] No discount 
78 Socks [Rs. 4] [Rs.312] [Rs. 35] 
37 Dresses [Rs.20] [ Rs.740] No discount 
49 Skirts [Rs. 8] [ Rs.392] [Rs. 33] 
    
 
SUBTOTAL 
[Rs. 92] 
TOTAL 
DISCOUNT 
   TOTAL  
 
 
RECEIPT N° 0568 
Date: [October 4th, 2012] 
Figure 1: Two applying-maths problems (Source: Boyden et al. 2016)
The round 4 Young Lives maths test questionnaire contains 29 questions in two sepa-
rate sections: 10 word problems that test the ability to apply mathematical concepts, and
19 problems that test mathematical knowledge in terms number recognition and arith-
metic operations. Two questions of each type are presented in figures 1 (applying) and
2 (knowing). I create two scores corresponding to both sets of questions. Raw scores are
calculated by adding one mark for each question answered correctly and zero otherwise.
Both scores are scaled to the range 0-1, and I further normalise them while estimating
school-type treatment effects to aid simple interpretation.
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Table 1: Household characteristics by school type
(N=1630) Private school Government school
at age 12 at age 12
Characteristic Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
Sector
Urban 0.474 - 0.091 -
Rural 0.526 - 0.909 -
Region
Coastal Andhra 0.311 - 0.378 -
Rayalaseema 0.276 - 0.321 -
Telangana 0.413 - 0.301 -
Child and household characteristics
Child is first-born 0.420 - 0.450 -
Male 0.618 - 0.486 -
Female 0.382 - 0.514 -
Father years of education 7.563 (5.092) 2.805 (4.133)
Mother years of education 5.509 (4.897) 1.550 (3.038)
Household size in round 1 5.464 (2.400) 5.467 (2.376)
Household size in round 2 5.537 (2.308) 5.576 (2.202)
Household size in round 3 5.426 (2.295) 5.542 (2.242)
Household size in round 4 4.966 (1.947) 4.925 (1.677)
Household Income in round 2 (Rs ’000) 68.770 (109.213) 25.479 (28.369)
Household Income in round 3 (Rs ’000) 173.380 (376.506) 54.199 (96.670)
Household Income in round 4 (Rs ’000) 180.907 (259.575) 83.373 (132.293)
Income proxies for round 1
Housing index 0.529 (1.022) -0.351 (1.208)
Furniture index 0.381 (0.845) -0.238 (0.649)
Amenities index 0.613 (1.248) -0.453 (0.739)
Electrical assets index 0.467 (0.917) -0.331 (0.628)
Household occupation
Farmer 0.183 - 0.253 -
Transport/trade/industry 0.300 - 0.121 -
Non-agricultural wage labour 0.260 - 0.497 -
Other 0.257 - 0.129 -
Household caste
Scheduled Caste 0.102 - 0.246 -
Scheduled Tribe 0.073 - 0.203 -
Backward Caste 0.477 - 0.457 -
Other Castes 0.235 - 0.064 -
Non-Hindu 0.113 - 0.029 -
Notes:
This table presents means and proportions of household and child characteristics according to the school in
which the child is enrolled, viz. private or government.
Housing, furniture, amenities and electrical assets indices are estimated using polychoric principal components
analysis (Kolenikov and Angeles 2009)
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Example Q1. Which of these is equal to 342? !
!
a)  3000+400+2 !
b)  30+40+2!
c)  300+40+2 !
d)  d) 3+4+2 !
!
Example Q2. Solve 923 X 123: !
!
a)  113283 !
b)  5526 !
c)  102283 !
d)  942183 !Figure 2: Two knowing-maths problems (Source: Boyden et al. 2016)
Table 2: Maths scores by school type and schooling trajectory
Type of maths
Applying Knowing
School type Proportion Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Overall Comparison
Private school at age 12 0.396 0.327 0.226 0.609 0.252
Government school at age 12 0.604 0.220 0.194 0.463 0.268
Specific schooling trajectories
Private school at ages 5, 8, 12 0.155 0.353 0.229 0.648 0.227
Government school at ages 5, 8, 12 0.167 0.197 0.192 0.440 0.275
Private school at ages 8 & 12 0.113 0.308 0.215 0.596 0.268
and not in school at age 5
Government school at ages 8 & 12 0.317 0.222 0.192 0.464 0.263
and not in school at age 5
Other trajectories 0.248 0.281 0.218 0.536 0.268
Notes:
This table presents average maths scores on procedural and reasoning-based abilities according to school
type and selected schooling trajectory. The scores are scaled to the interval [0-1].
‘Overall Comparison’ scores refer to those of students enrolled in respective school types at age 12. These
do not distinguish between (and are thus averaged over) the school type at ages 5 and 8.
All pair-wise comparisons using t-tests for procedural and reasoning abilities are highly significant
(p=0.000) demonstrating a private school advantage in simple averages. For example, comparing stu-
dents in private school at age 12 with their government school counterparts, or those in private school
through ages 5, 8, 12 with their government school counterparts, and so on.
3 Methods and results
I use propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) to estimate the causal
impact of school type on maths scores, controlling for schooling trajectories and household
characteristics. Propensity scores are estimated using logit models (results in appendix
A), and I use 1-1 matching, following Abadie and Imbens (2016) to adjust the standard
5
errors for the fact that the propensity score is itself also estimated.
Table 1 provides summary statistics according to children’s school type at age 12.
Table 2 summarises average maths scores in Applying and Knowing problems at age 12
by school type, and across the four most common schooling trajectories. Private school
students have higher scores on average (p=0.000 in all cases), and Applying scores are
lower than Knowing scores all round.
Table 3 provides three treatment effect estimates of private school enrolment on maths
scores at age 12, including an overall effect and two finer-grained effects based on specific
schooling trajectories shown in table 2. Row 1 of table 3 shows that students enrolled
in private school at age 12 have no statistically significant advantage in Applying scores
over their government school counterparts having controlled for schooling trajectories and
background characteristics, but that Knowing scores are higher by 0.26σ (p=0.003). Row
2 shows that this pattern is intensified if we compare children enrolled in private school
through ages 5, 8, and 12 with their government counterparts: the difference in Applying
scores remains insignificant while the private school advantage in Knowing scores increases
to 0.64σ (p=0.000). Row 3 shows that there is no private school advantage in either type
of maths scores for the sample of children who remained enrolled in the same school type
through ages 8-12 but were out of school at age 5.
4 Discussion
These results suggest that private schooling does not improve the ability to solve prob-
lems where the mathematical operations required have not been specified. These are
precisely the sorts of problems encountered in real life, for which mathematical abilities
are crucial. But private schooling does improve children’s ability to solve arithmetic prob-
lems where the required mathematical operations have been made explicit. These are the
types of problems likely encountered in exams, which could be one reason why parents
discern a private school learning advantage. This also suggests a potential explanation
6
Table 3: Average treatment effects of private schooling
Type of maths
Applying Knowing
Treatment θ S.E. p-value θ S.E. p-value N
Private school at age 12 0.131 0.135 0.333 0.256 0.085 0.003 1630
controlling for school type
at ages 5 and 8a
Private school at ages 5, 8 & 12b 0.236 0.535 0.659 0.643 0.033 0.000 522
Private school at ages 8 & 12 0.499 0.397 0.209 0.271 0.210 0.197 701
and out of school at age 5c
Notes:
This table presents average treatment effect estimates computed using propensity score matching for the indi-
cated subsamples. Standard errors use the adjustment proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2016) to account for
the fact that the propensity score is estimated. Both outcome variables are standardised, with mean zero and
standard deviation 1.
a The comparison group is children enrolled in government school at age 12.
b The comparison group is children enrolled in government school at ages 5, 8 and 12.
c All children in this subsample were out of school at age 5. The comparison group is children enrolled in
government school at ages 8 and 12.
for the mixed evidence in the literature, because depending on the relative weighting of
both types of questions, an overall maths score may or may not reveal a private school
advantage.
One wider implication of these findings is that increasing private school enrolments
are unlikely to lead to better real-world mathematical abilities. Although I have not
sought to in this paper, an open question remains as to how this ability shapes labour
market outcomes, and data from the fifth round of the Young Lives survey conducted
at age 16 (yet to be released) could help answer this question. The second implication
is methodological. These results demonstrate why comparisons between private and
government schools should also account for the relevance of different kinds of learning in
the real world, and the sorts of skills such learning represents.
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Appendix A Propensity score estimations
Table 4: Propensity score estimations
Covariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
School type at age 8
government (base) - -
private 2.505∗∗∗ (0.184) - -
out of school 1.499 (1.127) - -
School type at age 5
government (base) - -
private 0.495 (0.270) - -
out of school 0.0868 (0.219)
Type of locality
Urban (base) (base) (base)
Rural -0.368 (0.293) -1.309∗ (0.620) -0.618 (0.554)
Region
Coastal Andhra (base) (base) (base)
Rayalaseema 0.609∗∗ (0.224) 0.120 (0.520) 0.749 (0.410)
Telangana 0.619∗∗ (0.223) 1.757∗∗ (0.535) 1.610∗∗∗ (0.435)
Household caste-group
SC (base) (base) (base)
ST 0.525 (0.303) 0.360 (0.736) 0.700 (0.549)
BC 0.680∗∗ (0.226) 0.905 (0.517) 1.204∗∗ (0.409)
Other, Hindu 1.209∗∗∗ (0.299) 1.840∗∗ (0.667) 2.330∗∗∗ (0.530)
non-Hindu 0.849∗ (0.378) 1.978∗ (0.946) 1.637∗ (0.730)
Household occupation
independent farmer (base) (base) (base)
transport/trade/industry -0.678∗ (0.283) -0.798 (0.675) -0.0554 (0.491)
nonagri wage -0.690∗∗ (0.231) -0.812 (0.556) -0.632 (0.364)
other -0.516 (0.281) -1.024 (0.689) -0.244 (0.474)
Other child and household characteristics
First-born child 0.0592 (0.167) -1.260∗∗ (0.399) -0.0911 (0.280)
Female -0.534∗∗ (0.163) -1.675∗∗∗ (0.408) -1.095∗∗∗ (0.283)
Father’s education (yrs) 0.0661∗∗∗ (0.0193) 0.127∗∗ (0.0434) 0.108∗∗∗ (0.0319)
Mother’s education (yrs) 0.0389 (0.0247) 0.0938 (0.0578) 0.0883∗ (0.0438)
Household size age 1 0.0308 (0.0416) -0.195 (0.103) 0.113 (0.0691)
Household size age 5 -0.0235 (0.0572) -0.214 (0.159) -0.200∗ (0.0977)
Household size age 8 -0.0685 (0.0554) -0.123 (0.159) -0.0267 (0.0935)
Household size age 12 0.0180 (0.0557) 0.00744 (0.126) -0.274∗∗ (0.105)
(log) HH income at age 5 0.227∗ (0.102) 0.795∗∗ (0.296) 0.271 (0.184)
(log) HH income at age 8 0.0760 (0.0914) 0.722∗∗ (0.232) 0.337∗ (0.162)
(log) HH income at age 12 0.268∗ (0.111) 0.409 (0.241) 1.126∗∗∗ (0.213)
House-quality index at age 1 0.287∗∗∗ (0.0822) 0.251 (0.181) 0.123 (0.141)
Furniture assets index at age 1 0.0164 (0.122) 0.354 (0.278) 0.0892 (0.219)
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Amenities index at age 1 0.117 (0.122) 0.201 (0.296) 0.400 (0.233)
Electrical assets index at age 1 0.0403 (0.136) 0.934∗∗ (0.346) 0.489∗ (0.221)
Constant -8.358∗∗∗ (1.552) -17.55∗∗∗ (3.568) -19.27∗∗∗ (3.100)
N 1630 525 701
Notes:
Models 1-3 provide results for logit models used to estimate the propensity score.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Model 1: Children in private school at age 12 are coded as 1, and those in govt school as 0.
This model also controls for school type at ages 5 and 8
Model 2: Children in private school through ages 5-12 are coded as 1,
and those in govt school through ages 5-12 as 0.
Model 3: Children in private school through ages 8-12 and out of school at age 5 are coded as 1.
Those in govt school through ages 8-12 and out of school at age 5 are coded as 0.
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